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Abstract 
The question of eating ourselves (and of eating others) seems particularly 
pertinent in the context of artistic research, where, in its focus upon subjectivity 
and affirmation, the issue of framing an opposition can all too easily become 
moot. Orthorexia refers to an obsession with only ingesting food that is ‘pure’. 
What is considered to be ‘pure’ or ‘impure’ varies from person to person, but an 
individual’s belief about what constitutes healthy food may lead them to exclude 
certain nutrients or entire food groups from their diet, resulting in a 
cannibalisation of their internal resources. Conditions such as orthorexia, 
anorexia and bulimia reflect a set of broadly immanent, and affective concerns, 
whilst nevertheless embodying somewhat tensile attitudes towards relation. As 
such, they provide an interesting perspective from which we might address 
notions of affirmation, argumentation and opposition in a creative-research 
context.  
 
Arguably, anorexia is an auto-cannibalistic, overtly non-relational activity. That is 
to say, in avoiding consumption, the anorexic tends towards the imperceptible, 
whilst ultimately consuming themselves from within. In contrast to this, the 
bulimic appears to gorge on relations – tasting, affirming, and ingesting 
everything – whilst subsequently purging it from the body in a partially digested 
fashion. Interestingly, both conditions are accompanied by symptoms of body 
dysmorphia, a mode of self-caricature that also functions as a regulatory motif. 
Nevertheless, the bulimic remains close to average bodyweight whilst the anorexic 
withers away.  
 
With these observations in mind, this paper explores strategies of contestation and 
negation as they occur in Deleuzian philosophy – a philosophy highly influential 
in the formation of practices of artistic research, which is likewise associated with 
the affirmation of relations and with becoming imperceptible. It is claimed here, 
firstly that Deleuze’s mode of criticism is bulimic in character - that his directive 
that we should strive to become imperceptible can proceed only after he has first 
‘virtualised’ his opponents – reducing their difference to self-identity, and 
secondly, that it is through consideration of Deleuze’s virtualisation of others, that 
we might develop strategies of argumentation and creative contestation that are 
still noticeably lacking in the context of artistic research 
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Introduction 
This paper explores the inception and transformation of artistic research through 
the lens of the differential modes of being that are more commonly categorised as 
eating ‘disorders’. Conditions such as orthorexia, anorexia and bulimia reflect a 
set of broadly immanent, and affective concerns, whilst nevertheless embodying 
somewhat tensile attitudes towards relation. That is to say, eating is a relational 
activity, that may involve exploration, consumption, and digestion as well as 
rejection, expulsion and regurgitation. The process of eating per se places us in 
intimate relation with other things, whilst at the same time subjecting them to a 
form of dissolution – we partially absorb what we consume, whilst expelling the 
remainder from our bodies – sometimes in the form of vomit – but most often in 
the form of urine or faecal matter – a series of ‘waste’ substances, which 
nevertheless still teem with microbial life. In this sense, modes of consumption 
provide an interesting perspective from which we might address both the 
relational practice of affirmation, and non-relational practices of argumentation 
and opposition in the context of artistic-research. 
 
We will begin by exploring certain orthorexic tendencies that characterized the 
early stages of the debate concerning the legitimacy of artistic research. 
Orthorexia refers to an obsession with only ingesting food that is ‘pure’. As we 
shall see, the inception of artistic research took place in a climate of contestation – 
in which overtly purist, somewhat caricatured notions of both ‘research’ and ‘art’ 
were placed into opposition. It is significant, for instance that Christopher 
Frayling’s (1994) oft cited seminal paper which purported to provide an overview 
of stake-holding positions at the argument’s inception, began not by examining 
any actual voice within the debate, but chose instead to interrogate a series of 
Hollywood stereotypes. 
 
In the context of his discussion, Frayling presented us with a series of pure but 
lifeless stereotypes and caricatures – those of the impassioned, lunatic artist, the 
pragmatic designer-boffin, the designer-semiotician (as a surfer of signs and 
culture) and contrasting clichés of the ‘saintly’ and ‘mad’ scientist (Ibid, pp.3-4). 
Such abstractions enabled Frayling to stage a set of oppositions, but there is an 
important sense in which his paper failed to critically engage with the 
complexities of any position as it was actually held – preferring instead to debate a 
series of rather idealised, ghostly representations (Borgdorff, 2012, p.5). 
 
Perhap most interestingly, in this early point in the discussion, Frayling stated in 
no uncertain terms that he could not see how raw, un-textually mediated artistic 
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production could speak to the category of research, and that as a consequence he 
was unsure of how the term could be meaningfully employed. Frayling’s empty 
category of ‘research for art’ set the tone for the critique of the subjectivity, 
ineffability and lack of communication that coloured critical accounts of artistic 
practice, and which dominated much of the early debate concerning the 
legitimacy of artistic research. Ironically, however, it is Frayling’s disputed 
category of research for art that has come to prominence in more recent times, 
and which has been brought into focus in the performative context of artistic 
research - notably due to a turn away from epistemology and towards a series of 
more ontologically focused concerns. 
 
The Orthorexic Inception of Artistic Research 
The early contestation of what, in an Anglophone context, was once known as 
practice-based or practice-led research can be seen as orthorexic in the sense that 
it driven by overtly narrow, and somewhat purist conceptions of both research 
and art. That is to say, in the early stages of the debate the image of artistic 
practice from the perspective of its critics was that of an impure, or tainted food 
that was not fit for consumption. Those who aligned themselves with ‘traditional’ 
modes of research saw artistic practice, as resulting in ill defined, highly subjective 
outcomes, which were poorly suited to what were taken to be the at once 
objective, rigorous, and communicative demands of academia. Those hostile to 
practice-led modes of enquiry focused upon what they took to be the impurity of 
artistic practice when seen from a traditional academic perspective. That is to say, 
they focused upon the ways in which the idea of artistic research seemed to jar 
with academic values and to square poorly with what they took to be its rational, 
investigative ideals (Frayling, 1994; Elkins, 2009; Durling, 2002; Biggs & Büchler, 
2010). In short, when seen from the perspective of more traditional research 
paradigms, modes of artistic research in which sensation, or the subjectivity of 
artistic practice played a major part, were simply not considered Kosha food. 
 
Whilst, much criticism focused upon the practicalities of assessment and the 
difficulties in determining the degree to which knowledge might be tacitly 
encoded in artistic artefacts, it was the performative dimension of the artwork that 
seemed most unpalatable to critics, with particular scrutiny being cast upon the 
subjective and interpretative context of artistic exhibition (Durling, 2002; Biggs, 
2002; 2008). 
 
It seems clear today that the issue of ‘purity’ from the perspective of the academy 
foregrounded a somewhat positivistic research agenda, whilst aligning this with 
particularly propositional view of language. Those critical of artistic modes of 
research frequently took issue with what was perceived to be artistic researchers’ 
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resistance to, or reluctance to engage with verbal or textual modes of 
argumentation (Durling, Friedman & Gutherson, 2003; Elkins, 2009) - the 
importance of language in the formulation and structuring of argument was 
stressed, along with its power to capture, compare, and evaluate information 
(Biggs, 2002; 2003). We might say that for the critics of artistic research, it was 
important not only to consume the right food, but also to eat with the correct 
implements, and with the appropriate kind of decorum. The idea that there might 
be more visceral approaches to the consumption of food - that we might choose to 
eat with our hands, for instance or that artefacts as performative assemblages 
could in any sense ‘speak for themselves’ was initially granted very little 
countenance.  
 
It is important to recognise, however, that issues of ‘purity’ in representation were 
not limited to those who purported to speak for the academy. Whilst orthorexics 
are united in their belief that the food which they ingest must be ‘pure’, there is an 
important sense in which what is considered to be ‘pure’ or ‘impure’ varies from 
individual to individual, and many practitioners were outraged at the prospect of 
a mode of artistic research that did not sanction artistic practice as a way of 
engaging with the world. Here the notion of purity centred upon the artwork, and 
the potential for it to become tainted in its intersection with positivistic and overly 
rationalised research processes. Thus, commentators such as Dennis Strand 
(1998. p.16) stressed the way in which the methodologies of artistic researchers 
are “in the arts”, and that their investigations are “in their practice”. Likewise, 
Brad Haseman (2006), suggested that artistic researchers were ‘impatient with the 
methodological restrictions ...and the emphasis on written outcomes’ (Ibid, p. 3). 
Haseman noted how artistic researchers preferred to construct experiential 
starting points, to ‘lead research through practice’ and to explore presentational 
forms that are ‘not bound by the linear and sequential constraints of discursive or 
arithmetic writing’ (Ibid, p. 5). In a similar vein, Haseman articulated an 
important tension between practice-led research and the idea of ‘narrow problem 
setting’ (Ibid, p. 4) or of rigid methodological requirements being imposed at a 
project’s outset. Such observations served to fuel the debate over the extent to 
which research in the creative arts might consist of artworks or exhibitions, as well 
as the idea that artistic practice tainted by an academic research context could 
only result in art that was in some sense ‘bad’, or simply illustrative of an 
underlying theoretical position. 
 
Orthorexic Subtraction 
Ultimately, an orthorexic’s belief about what constitutes ‘healthy’ food can lead 
them to exclude certain nutrients or entire food groups from their diet. Thus, 
critics who purported to speak in the name of the institution attempted to exclude 
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the artwork, subjectivity, sensation and affect from the research context, unless 
they were mediated through some kind of textual production; whilst those who 
spoke in the name of artistic practice attempted to exclude the written word and 
what was taken to be an overly impersonal, positivistic concern with objectivity 
from their enquiry, unless they were encountered in a performative context - or in 
a somewhat satirical fashion. 
 
The issue of othorexic opposition was perhaps exacerbated by the way in which 
many of the prominent institutional voices such as Michael Biggs and James 
Elkins - were individuals who pointedly framed themselves as ‘ex-practitioners’. 
Biggs, in collaboration with the ex-architect and designer Daniela Büchler (now 
deceased) stood as one of the most extreme voices with respect to institutional 
alignment. Biggs and Büchler were particularly sceptical of the role of the artwork 
in the practice-based submission - positioning artistic activity and its outcomes as 
in some sense inessential with respect to the requirements of legitimate research 
practice (Biggs, 2004; Biggs & Büchler, 2008). 
 
Many of Biggs’ and Büchler’s writings sought to diminish the importance of 
sensation and to subtract the performative dimension of the artwork. Biggs 
suggested that what we ordinarily think of as experiential feeling should be 
repositioned as a ‘representation’ of a more fundamental ‘experiential content’ 
which, he claimed was propositional in character, and connected with the 
‘meaning’ of an experience (Biggs, 2004, p.4). Whilst Biggs positioned his 
distinction between ‘experiential feeling’ and ‘experiential content’ as something 
which was self-evident, or at least ‘relatively straightforward’, early critics such as 
the craft and design researcher Kristina Niedderer noted the way in which Biggs’ 
concept of experiential content and its relationship to experiential feeling was ill 
defined (Niedderer, 2008). 
 
Whatever the exact nature of Biggs ‘experiential content’, it is clear that he was 
attempting to populate this concept in a way that leant towards and ultimately 
privileged qualities of a linguistic and conceptual order. That is to say, Biggs 
claimed that experiential content is connected with ‘the meaning’ of an 
experience, and with ‘the way in which it might be related to our shared context’ 
(Biggs, 2004, p.4). Thus Biggs’ concept of experiential content was discursively 
focused, and had a predominately conceptual orientation. Conversely, experience 
was positioned in secondary terms, as a shadowy reflection of its conceptual other. 
That is to say, Biggs suggested that the representations that constitute experiential 
feeling were in some sense partial, confused and in need of clarification. Such 
remarks were typically accompanied by suggestions that the work of clarification 
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could be undertaken through a form of conceptual and linguistic analysis, and this 
served further to privilege a textual mode of exposition (Ibid, p.20). 
 
As is often the case in the context of orthorexia, the exclusion of certain food 
groups results in a cannibalisation of internal resources. Having virtually excluded 
art and sensation from their diet, Biggs and Büchler were forced to live off the 
more paltry visual and performative resources aligned with and sanctioned by 
more traditional modes of research - namely the graph, the Venn diagram, and a 
series of other broadly representational diagramming procedures. When artworks 
did feature, they did so in a secondary, textually mediated fashion - functioning as 
symptoms of a partially veiled territory that could then be unpacked through 
language (Ibid, p.10). 
 
In discussion of the relationship between language and the artwork in the context 
of research, Biggs made use of the Münsterberg illusion (see below - the 
horizontal straight lines are supposed to appear crooked). This image was drawn 
from the work of Richard Gregory in the field of the psychology of perception, 
and was discussed alongside Johannes Ittens’s use of illusions of simultaneous 
brightness contrast at the Bauhaus. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Münsterberg Illusion (Biggs, 2007, p.8) 
 
 
From Biggs’ perspective, visual illusions were interesting in so far as they were 
capable of eliciting an unusual form of experience that stood as a symptom of 
something else which was worthy of further investigation (Biggs, 2007, p.9). It is in 
this capacity that Biggs saw optical illusions as being in some sense analogous to 
artistic artefacts - with the caveat that conceptual analysis might be substituted for 
scientific investigation in this domain. Adopting something of a positivistic 
register, Biggs emphasised the way in which subjects ‘consistently experienced’ 
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(Ibid, p.8) the horizontal lines in this figure as crooked - resulting in a distorted 
figure, that is nevertheless stable – an example of ‘good’ Gestaltist form.  
 
Whilst there is a sense in which we might describe this, or any other optical 
illusion in affective or performative terms, the Münsterberg illusion is peculiarly 
settled in its effects - it possesses a quasi-object-like constancy - offering something 
of a one-dimensional performance, which serves to accentuate its affinity with the 
linguistic proposition. Thus, there is an epistemic confidence in Biggs approach to 
this question which will shortly be subjected to scrutiny. 
 
Thus far, we have seen how more positivistically inclined researchers had 
attempted to expel the artwork and had limited themselves to the consumption of 
the rather conventional diagrammatic resources associated with more traditional 
modes of research. There is, however, a way in which, the practitioner’s aversion 
to text could be said to have resulted in a similar cannibalisation of the textual 
resources internal to artistic practice - with text being sanctioned only when 
mediated through art - when appearing as a textual trope, or in the form of 
performative writing. Whilst we might make the case that the resistance to 
conventional textual exposition, could serve to limit the critical power of a 
research project, there is another sense in which such practices provide an 
important key to understanding a way in which text can nevertheless function as a 
mode of affective critique. That is to say, there is something valuable for our 
purposes here in recognising the processual dimension of textual production and 
the way in which it might be aligned with more tacit, material and affective 
modes of engaging with the world. 
 
As the Deleuzian theorist Manuel DeLanda (2011) has noted, despite the 
association with conceptual and propositional views of language, the activities of 
reading, writing and arguing persuasively are ultimately skill based - and as such 
they are learnt via a mode of material apprenticeship. As a prerequisite, they 
require a vast array of embodied, tacit knowledge, and as rhetorical practices they 
are as much concerned with affect as they are with propositional discourse. 
Likewise, the notion that writing might be considered a form of creative, long 
durational, intertextual (relational) composition is a persistent trope in 
philosophical reflection on writing and the arts. What can be found initially in the 
writings of a number of prominent figures from the history of process philosophy 
– e.g. John Dewey, Susanne Langer, is later expressed in post structural terms by 
figures such as Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Roland 
Barthes. 
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Dewey, writing long before the post-structural turn, recognised the emergent, 
developmental, and corporeal process of writing, along with the artificial, cultural 
isolation of its product. In the opening to his Art as Experience he stated that the 
book, which he aligns with the work of art, ‘somehow becomes isolated from the 
human conditions under which it was brought into being ... a wall is built around 
[it]’ (Dewey, 1934). He went on to stress that ‘if one sets out to understand the 
flowering of plants, he is committed to finding out something about the 
interactions of soil, air, water and sunlight that condition [their] growth’ (Ibid). 
Dewey’s initial observations concerning the creative, processual character of 
writing and making, were extended by Deleuze and by a number of other late 
twentieth century theorists - albeit in a slightly less personal fashion - into the 
realm of intertextuality and material relationality. Thus, for Deleuze a book is ‘a 
collection of bifurcating, divergent and muddled lines’ that ‘are unattributable to 
individuals’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, pp. ix-x), which has ‘has only itself, in 
connection with other assemblages’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 4.), and 
perhaps most importantly for our purposes here, it is “a tiny cog in an extra-
textual machine” (cited in Bearn, 2000). 
 
Accordingly, the work of Dewey et al points to a long intellectual history 
underpinning the idea that written objects and artefacts embody a convoluted 
developmental and relational history. It should be clear that there is a sense in 
which, the purist conception of a text as a static object or as a stable propositional 
structure masks a complex productive history in the form of substitutions, 
redevelopments and the emergence of ideas that take place over the course of its 
composition – which is to say that a text embodies a developmental complexity of 
a logical, aesthetic and semantic order - and in this sense, it is anything other than 
pure. 
 
The figure of Deleuze has become increasingly important in this latter half of my 
paper - this is largely due to the ascendency of Deleuzian thought in the domain 
of contemporary artistic research. That is to say, the initial climate of ‘purity’ and 
‘contestation’ dissipated as the notion of artistic research as a mode of relational, 
or rhizomatic investigation began to emerge. Over time, the broadly orthorexic 
context of the debate has undergone something of a significant shift - this was 
perhaps mostly due to the way in which an ever-escalating diversity of artistic 
research practices began to embrace the visceral impurities of materiality, 
contingency, and the encounter - as well as beginning to recognise the ‘impurity’ 
of traditional research processes, in a bid to find ways of operating smoothly in 
the context of increasingly striated institutions - I’m thinking here of Borgdorff’s 
application of Latour’s Actor Network Theory to the traditional academic 
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context, and his ‘performing artistic research into existence’ through conferences 
such as this, and organisations such as SAR (Borgdorff, 2013). 
 
Such practices have a strong affinity with a number of broadly Deleuzian 
concerns, and it is perhaps due to a certain affinity between Deleuzian thinking 
and the emerging tenets of artistic research that Deleuzian philosophy has proved 
so attractive to many artistic researchers. Accordingly, the value of the process-
philosophical take on writing - and on the ontogentic context of textual 
production, is useful in so far as it enables us to think of the production of 
textuality in material and transformative terms. That is to say, there is a way in 
which a text - be it propositional or rhetorical in character - can become yet one 
more register of affect. 
 
Given the prevalence of Deleuzean thought in the setting of artistic research, it is 
all too easy to forget that despite his veneration of material-sensation Deleuze was 
predominately a writer - albeit a writer with an affective and corporeal agenda - 
who advocated a peculiarly operatic conception of philosophy, claiming in 
Negotiations that: 
 
Style in philosophy strains toward three different poles: concepts, or 
new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and construing; 
and affects, or new ways of feeling. They're the philosophical trinity, 
philosophy as opera. You need all three to get things moving. 
(Deleuze, 1995, pp. 164-165) 
 
It is this notion of mobilization or movement, that can be utilized to frame a 
notion of Deleuzian contestation. Given the Deleuzian emphasis upon 
affirmation, one might be forgiven for thinking that processes of research inspired 
by Deleuze, should revel in their impurity and indiscriminately gorge on 
relations.. However, it is important to distinguish between straightforward 
relational gluttony, and a bulimic consumption of relations that is, I think, closest 
to Deleuze own philosophical approach. It is likewise important to be wary of 
how easily the latter can slide into an anorexic mode of critique, that is ultimately 
non-relational in character. 
 
Deleuze, Anorexia, Bulimia and Contestation  
What I am describing as an anorexic take on Deleuze arises when the emphasis 
upon artistic subjectivity takes too much of a hold. What perhaps begins as a kind 
of line of flight - as molecular movement in the face of an at once molar and 
entrenched opposition, becomes firstly a turning away, and ultimately a turning 
inward (a self-enfolding). When taken en-mass, such practices perhaps serve as a 
performative reminder of the multiplicity of ways of being in the world - and thus 
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in some ways they collectively contest myths of universality. However, it is also the 
case that when taken in their singularity, they lose much of their political force. 
Thus, it becomes difficult to address the significance of such projects - to specify 
exactly what they oppose or what is at stake. Whilst actual, lived forms of alterity 
and difference are of great importance to a post-structural political setting, there is 
a danger that the context of extreme qualitative specificity dilutes any collective 
political power. Perhaps a way out of this empasse might be to consider the many 
practices performed in the name of artistic research in relation to something like 
the affinity politics of Haraway (1991). That is to say, we might position artistic 
research per se as a banner under which a radical plurality and diversity of actual 
subject positions might find a kind of affinity or investment, whilst nevertheless 
retaining a palpable sense of individual specificity and difference. 
 
Ultimately, however, there is something strangely anorexic and non-relational 
about such quasi-solipsistic activity. Whilst it is clear that artistic research has 
generated a cacophony of tiny voices, it is sometimes less clear to me whether we 
are swimming or drowning in this Leibnizian sea - an observation inspired by 
Mick Wilson’s paper that was delivered at the first Deleuze and Artistic Research 
conference (Wilson, 2017). 
 
For Deleuze, the danger of what he and Guattari described as ‘the black hole of 
subjectivity’ was that it can result in a kind of micro-facism - in a self-consumed 
desiring subject pursing its own end whilst failing either to engage with alternative 
planes of becoming, or to innovate through the release of any energy of its own 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p.207). Ultimately, this mode of anorexic, auto-
cannibalism results in kind of a withering - in a becoming something less than 
imperceptible - it is the virtual divested of its power. 
 
This criticism cannot so easily be directed at Deleuze himself. Indeed, Deleuze’s 
inscription of creativity into the very essence of the world has been positioned as 
both foundationalist and fundamentalist by many of his commentators (Hallward 
2006; May 1997; Mullarkey 2006) - and bearing in mind that Deleuze attempted 
to take the entire history of representational thinking to task, he can hardly be 
positioned as having been in any sense critically, or politically demure. 
 
Andrew Culp (2006) has recently produced some interesting work on negativity in 
Deleuze, which attempts to counter the image of affirmation that is so readily 
associated with Deleuzian philosophy. In his Dark Deleuze, Culp, writing against 
the affirmative cannon of joy that is typically associated with Deleuzean thinking, 
emphasises: the prevalence of negative prefixes (such as ‘de’, ‘in’ and ‘non’) that 
pepper the Deleuzian lexicon; the inability of Deleuze to fully exorcise Nietzsche’s 
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sense of cruelty or taste for Destruction, and Deleuze’s professed hostility to the 
idea of communication - a practice which Deleuze saw as resulting in the 
production of abstract and empty generalities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 28-
29). 
 
I would argue that Deleuze’s mode of criticism is neither gluttonous nor anorexic 
in character - it operates, instead, in a bulimic fashion. The bulimic appears to 
gorge on relations – tasting, affirming, and ingesting everything – but 
subsequently purges them from the body in a partially digested fashion. Thus, 
Deleuze can be seen to proceed by ‘virtualising’ his opponents - by reducing their 
difference to a kind of self-identity, before going on to expel them from the body. 
This is perhaps most apparent when we consider his transformative readings of 
other philosophers, which facilitated the birth of monstrous offspring, and his 
similarly transformative approach to extant philosophical terminology and 
ordinary language use. As John Ó Maoilearca (formely John Mullarkey) has 
noted, Deleuze has a tendency not only to fuse terms that are traditionally 
considered as opposites, but also to hijack and subvert the meaning of existing 
nomenclature (Mullarkey 2006, 17). That is to say, in Deleuze’s hands, repetition 
becomes the repetition of difference as opposed to the repetition of identity, 
experience becomes a transcendental, material condition - something that is both 
sub-representational and, ironically, apriori in character – whilst essence is 
similarly repositioned as the engine of change. 
 
In the nearest thing that we have to a statement of method in A Thousand Plateaus, 
we are counselled by Deleuze and Guattari to ‘lodge [ourselves] on a stratum’, 
and ‘to experiment with the opportunities it offers’ and to ‘try out continuums 
of intensities segment by segment’  (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, p.178). In this 
paper, I have attempted to draw attention to the context of orthorexic purity 
underlying the early debate concerning the legitimacy of artistic research. In so 
doing, I have celebrated the impurity of emerging artistic research processes, 
whilst in some sense mourning the loss of what was an active - if over simplistic - 
sense of contestation underpinning the legitimacy debate. I have suggested that in 
its place, we might embrace the widest possible toolset in exploring abductive 
strategies of co-deterritorialisation through the employment of concepts, percepts 
and affects. Whilst artistic research could be said to enable a becoming 
imperceptible on the part of the practitioner, it might be interesting to entertain 
the possibility of practices that also engender a co-becoming, which serves to 
transform the thing from which we flee. 
 
In keeping with this spirit, I will end this paper with a little playful manipulation 
of the intensities of Biggs’ Münsterberg figure - the image which supported his 
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overtly propositional view of language and sensation that was introduced earlier 
in this paper. With the introduction of a curvature in the differential spacing of 
the cells, a more unsettled, vertiginous counter-image can be produced that 
exhibits stronger kinetic, performative qualities (of the sort that we might associate 
with practices of Op Art). Not only do the lines now seem to exhibit a curvature, 
the curves themselves seems to admit of a broad spectrum of unpredictable 
variation. Thus, there is clear sense in which this (static) image will neither fully 
settle nor fully resolve.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Mobilzed Münsterberg Illusion. 
 
The continuous movement and perceptual variation of the mobilised version of 
the Münsterberg illusion presents difficulties for Biggs’ propositional approach to 
the image. This counter motif is intended to problematise Biggs’ argument that 
the ‘experiential content’ of an image has an affinity with the proposition. Such 
an idea seems misapplied when we consider our relationship to kinetic imagery 
that exhibits a resistance to closure of experiential form. These and related forms 
of illusion - which we might go so far as to position as open, subjectivist forms of 
animation - employ counterposed, differential and intensive relations - conjuring 
active, kinetic perceptual spaces, which ultimately resist both conceptual and 
linguistic capture. 
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